US Military Commissions Act 2006—Turning Bad Policy Into Bad Law
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The following is from Amnesty International looking at why the US Military Commissions Act of 2006 is a bad idea. You can see the original article at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR5115420061.
US Military Commissions Act of 2006 – Turning bad policy into bad law
September 29, 2006
AI Index: AMR 51/154/2006
In recent days, human rights violations perpetrated by the USA throughout the
war on terror have in effect been given the congressional stamp of approval. With the passing of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 by the US House of Representatives on 27 September and the Senate on 28 September, Congress has turned bad executive policy into bad law. This document looks back on the evolution of the executive’s
war on terror detention policies, in order to illustrate the sort of violations in which Congress, through inaction and now legislation, has become complicit. Amnesty International will continue to campaign for the USA’s
war on terror detention policies and practices to be brought into full compliance with international law, and for repeal of any law that fails to meet this test.
On 21 September 2001, Amnesty International faxed a letter to President George W. Bush. The organization urged the President to put respect for human rights and the rule of law at the heart of his country’s response to the crime against humanity that was perpetrated on 11 September 2001.
In the wake of a crime of such magnitude, the letter said,
principled leadership becomes crucial… We urge you to lead your government to take every necessary human rights precaution in the pursuit of justice.
Amnesty International deeply regrets that its appeal fell on deaf ears. The past five years have seen the USA engage in systematic violations of international law, with a distressing impact on thousands of detainees and their families. Human rights violations have included:
- Secret detention
- Enforced disappearance
- Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
- Outrages upon personal dignity, including humiliating treatment
- Denial and restriction of habeas corpus
- Indefinite detention without charge or trial
- Prolonged incommunicado detention
- Arbitrary detention
- Unfair trial procedures
Yet at the same time, US officials have continued to characterize the USA as a
nation of laws and one that in the
war on terror is committed to what it calls the
non-negotiable demands of human dignity, including the
rule of law.
It is tempting to resort to accusations of hypocrisy, particularly when the USA itself condemns the very same practices if carried out by other countries. But in seeking to challenge US conduct, perhaps it is more useful to consider how vulnerable the law is to elastic interpretation, manipulation or selective application by the state. And that, for better or worse, a government can use policy to drive the law rather than vice versa. In the USA’s case, a long-held resistance to applying international law to its own conduct compounds the problem.
Under the US administration’s selective application of the laws of war and outright dismissal of international human rights law, for example, the Guantánamo detention camp is the
most transparent facility in the history of warfare according to the Pentagon, rather than the icon of lawlessness that many outside the USA perceive it to be.
In similar vein, with elastic interpretation of the law, secret detention becomes
legal. In his speech on 6 September 2006 confirming and defending the Central Intelligence Agency’s program of secret detentions, President Bush emphasised that
this program has been subject to multiple legal reviews by the Department of Justice and CIA lawyers; they’ve determined it complied with our laws.
Again, there is a stark
disconnect between the USA and the international community. After all, President Bush’s speech came only weeks after two expert United Nations bodies – the Committee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee – told the US government that secret detentions violated the USA’s international treaty obligations. In effect, the President was rejecting the conclusions of these UN bodies, as well as admitting that the USA had resorted to enforced disappearance, a crime under international law.
The US administration’s interpretation of the law has been driven by its policy choices rather than a credible postulation of its legal obligations. One core policy choice was to frame its response to the 11 September attacks in terms of a global
war rather than as a criminal law enforcement effort. The law would have to be made to fit this
new paradigm, as President Bush characterized the situation in a 7 February 2002 memorandum on detentions.
At a press conference in June 2004, with the administration seeking to quell the criticism of its policies following the Abu Ghraib torture revelations, then White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales recalled the administration’s post-9/11 discussions thus:
[S]ome questions we faced were, for example: What is the legal status of individuals caught in this battle? How will they be treated? To what extent can those detained be questioned to attain information concerning possible future terrorist attacks? What are the rules? What will our policies be?…Just as military theorists thought about new strategies and tactics to fight terrorists, so, too, did lawyers in looking at how this war fits into the current legal landscape.
From these questions flowed a number of memorandums written in late 2001 and early 2002 by administration lawyers concocting legal positions on a variety of issues. These issues included the limits of the prohibition on torture or other ill-treatment, whether the choice of Guantánamo as a location for detentions would keep detainees out of the reach of the US courts, and the use of military commissions, to quote a November 2001 Justice Department memorandum, as
entirely creatures of the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief. The White House Counsel himself drafted advice to the President suggesting that a benefit of not applying the Geneva Conventions to detainees picked up in the Afghanistan conflict would be that prosecutions of US personnel under the US War Crimes Act would become more difficult.
Sure enough, almost five years and numerous alleged war crimes later, there have been no prosecutions under the Act. Similarly there have been no prosecutions under the USA’s extraterritorial anti-torture statute despite the widespread allegations of torture. With the USA’s rejection in 2002 of the International Criminal Court, and its subsequent campaign to have other countries agree never to surrender US nationals to the ICC, a pattern of US impunity had been established even before the Military Commissions Act exacerbated the situation.
The legal advice in these early administration memorandums thus seemed tailored to fit desired policy outcomes. Precedents that suited the policy were emphasised, laws that did not were ignored or downplayed. The indefinite detention regime in Guantánamo and the denial of habeas corpus was one result. A less than absolute ban on torture or other ill-treatment was another. Secret detention was a third. And unfair trial by military commissions still threatens to be a fourth.
The government’s policy of indefinite detention without charge, as practiced in Guantánamo and elsewhere, is thus a direct consequence of the war paradigm. Instead of treating these detainees as criminal suspects, the US authorities have branded them as loosely-defined
enemy combatants in a global conflict. That the USA sees the world as the
battlefield is illustrated by the fact that those currently held in Guantánamo include individuals picked up in Gambia, Bosnia, Mauritania, Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Thailand, and United Arab Emirates, as well as Afghanistan.
Under the administration’s conceptualization, such detainees are both a potential source of intelligence and a potential threat to national security. Access to lawyers is perceived as detrimental to the interrogation process. Access to the courts is seen as disruptive of military operations. In the version of the Military Commissions Act which President Bush sent to Congress on 6 September 2006, the administration argued that trials with lower standards of justice than apply in existing US courts were necessary because
the terrorists with whom the United States is engaged in armed conflict have demonstrated a commitment…to the abuse of American legal processes. In this argument, the administration seemed to be putting the US lawyers who have litigated on behalf of the Guantánamo detainees on the wrong side of President Bush’s
with us or with the terrorists divide. In this nation of laws, it seemed, you were either with the administration’s lawyers or you were with the terrorists.
Although branded as
killers by the Commander-in-Chief, and as
evil by Vice President Cheney, the Guantánamo detainees are not necessarily considered as individuals bearing responsibility for specific criminal conduct. Indeed, the question of trials of
alien unlawful enemy combatants is viewed by the administration as an entirely separate issue, one that does not affect the detention regime itself. According to the administration, detentions may last until the end of the conflict, the definition and timing of which – like the detentions themselves – is a matter of executive discretion, and potentially indefinite. Even if acquitted by a military commission, a detainee could still be returned to indefinite detention as an
The vast majority of those held by the USA in the
war on terror are unlikely ever to face US judicial proceedings. As noted above, that is not why they are detained. Even the small number of detainees who have been charged have not come to trial. Part of the reason is that the administration’s policy-driven interpretation of the law has inevitably collided with that of much of the legal community, including judicial authorities such as the US Supreme Court in the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ruling of 29 June 2006. But relatively narrowly-framed judicial decisions interpreted narrowly and in self-serving fashion by the executive make for slow progress towards full respect for human rights. Thus, more than two years after the Supreme Court ruled in Rasul v. Bush that the US courts had jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus appeals from the Guantánamo detainees, not a single one of them currently held there has had the lawfulness of his detention judicially reviewed.
The response of the US administration to the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ruling has perhaps been even more shocking, although apparently not shocking enough to nudge Congress finally into calling the executive to account for
war on terror abuses. Indeed, President Bush’s defence of the CIA’s program of secret detention and
alternative interrogation techniques policy, which he said had been called into question by the Hamdan ruling and therefore needed congressional approval, showed an administration in assertively unapologetic mood.
Again, one can begin to trace the administration’s manipulation of the law to fit its policy. According to a document recently issued by the Director of National Intelligence, after
high-value detainee Abu Zubaydah was captured in Pakistan in March 2002 and handed over to the USA, he stopped
cooperation with his US interrogators. In order to overcome this lack of cooperation,
over the ensuing months, the CIA designed a new interrogation program and
sought and obtained legal guidance from the Department of Justice that none of the new procedures violated the US statutes prohibiting torture.
Any such claim of legality rings hollow. For until the Detainee Treatment Act was passed in December 2005 (in the face of executive opposition), Department of Justice lawyers took the position that because of the reservation attached to the USA’s ratification of the Convention against Torture in 1994, the USA had no treaty obligation on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment with respect to foreign nationals held in US custody overseas. In addition, in August 2002, the Justice Department provided legal advice in a memorandum which only came to light in mid-2004 after the Abu Ghraib torture revelations. It was reportedly written in response to a CIA request for legal protections for its interrogators. The memorandum stated among other things that interrogators could cause a great deal of pain before crossing the threshold to torture, that there were a
significant range of acts that might constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment but would not rise to the level of torture and be prosecutable under the US torture statute, and that the President could override international or national prohibitions on torture.(1)
The administration has not elaborated upon what the CIA
alternative interrogation techniques have entailed, simply relaying the politically expedient claim that the resistance of Abu Zubaydah and the other detainees had been broken. Sued in court, the CIA has so far been successful in its ploy of refusing to confirm or deny the existence of an alleged presidential directive and an alleged Justice Department memorandum authorizing and outlining the secret detention program and its interrogation methods. However, the methods are widely reported to have included techniques that would clearly violate international law.(2)
Even now, more than two years after the Abu Ghraib revelations, the USA’s protections against torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment are less than adequate. Among other things, the USA’s treaty reservations mean that the USA considers itself, including under the Detainee Treatment Act, bound by the prohibition on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment only to the extent that it matches existing US law. Under US Supreme Court jurisprudence, conduct is banned that
shocks the conscience. Justice Department lawyers reportedly view this as allowing consideration of the context in which abuse of detainees occurs. Under such consideration, if a detainee is believed to have information considered by the government to be important to national security, the
shocks the conscience test could be interpreted by the government as permitting conduct that would be otherwise be unlawful. As Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, Representative Peter King, said:
If we capture bin Laden tomorrow and we have to hold his head under water to find out when the next attack is going to happen, we ought to be able to do that.(3) Or as Senator John Thune from South Dakota said in an earlier hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
when you talk about humiliating or degrading or those type