Handover of Power to Iraqis

Iraqi Sovereignty handed over early and quickly

When sovereignty was handed over, it came very quickly -- some two days before it was meant to. The U.S.-led Coalition forces and the new Iraqi Prime Minister, Iyad Allawi (who was the one that suggested the early handover) implied this was to prevent resistance and terrorist groups from foiling a handover and catching them off guard, while critics suggested this may be because the U.S. still did not have full control of the security situation and if it was difficult enough to provide security in general, then providing security during an official handover ceremony would be impossible. (The quick and early handover was also done in secret and finished before it was announced to the world, and even some of the new Iraqi ministers!)

The demand of tougher security and increased stability may prove to be a double-edged sword, Inter Press Service (IPS) noted, because on the one hand this was an opportunity for a government to prove itself, though on the other hand, those who want to sabotage any democracy may increase terrorist attacks.

The same IPS article also noted that an advisor to the new minister of the interior was relieved that Coalition head Paul Bremer was leaving so quickly and that power had transitioned, because they were always afraid if Paul Bremer would have overruled their decisions. While Bremer was around he still exercised ultimate authority, the advisor said. We never knew when one of our instructions would be countered by him.

Iraqi Sovereignty indeed turns out to be very limited

Win Without War, an antiwar coalition in the U.S. summarizes why the hand over of power to Iraq is controversial and how the U.S. retains a lot of indirect control:

In addition, the antiwar coalition feared that U.S. actions were making Americans less safe by

1. Fueling the insurgency in Iraq and terrorism world-wide;
2. Weakening America by diminishing its credibility even further while continuing to isolate the U.S. from allies.

The above was a press release for a full page ad they had taken out in the New York Times. The copy of the ad on their own web site provides sources for their claims and points.

The Washington Post noted how U.S. Administrator for Iraq until the handover, Paul Bremmer, had curbed the powe of Iraqis in various ways, and is quoted at length:

While a number of other rules Bremer has drafted also sound positive, many, when considered in the backdrop of insecurity and violence may be met with stern resistence. The above Post article also ended with comments from Juan Cole, a University of Michigan professor who is a specialist on Iraq. Cole, the Post said, noted that the appointed electoral commission's power to eliminate political parties or candidates for not obeying laws would allow it to disqualify people someone didn't like.

Cole likened the power of the commission to that of religious mullahs in Iran, who routinely use their authority to remove candidates before an election. In a way, Mr. Bremer is using a more subtle form than the one used by hard-liners in Iran to control their elections, Cole said.

The Associated Press made a number of observations. For example

There are at least two additional interesting things to note from the above:

1. The Post article implied that some of Bremer's orders will remain in effect unless overturned by Iraq's interim government, while AP noted that the interim government would not be able to amend the transitional law or interim consitution. If AP is right, then it would strengthen critics' argument of U.S. control, and even if the Post is right that the interim government can overrule all the laws, then it still shows U.S. intentions.
2. Perhaps an interesting observation for those who see all forms of Islam as a threat to the world in some way is the note AP made that it was the influential Shiite clergy that sought to limit the powers of an unelected administration picked by the current U.S. administration. (As an opinion piece in the Baltimore Sun notes (July 4, 2004), democracy may come from a different source than expected. Someday there may be real democracy in Iraq. If that day comes, it may be because a legitimate Iraqi leadership was inspired by the nobility and eloquence of America's founding fathers, the common sense and decency and honesty of their motivations. Not much of that exists among their political descendants in Washington today.)

Associated Press also noted an example of a controversial law that Bremer had signed which gave U.S. and other Western civilian contractors immunity from Iraqi law while performing their jobs in Iraq. The idea outraged many Iraqis the AP noted, as the law allows foreigners to act with impunity even after the occupation.

Sovereignty Under Continued Occupation?

The issue of remaining U.S. forces under U.S. command presents a dilemma. On the one hand some argue that they are needed to help with security. On the other hand, others argue that it is because of their presence that there is worse security and instability.

A commentary by M. B. Naqvi in IPS argues that transfer of sovereignty is fiction, while occupation remains fact. What kind of sovereignty will [Iraq] have if there are foreign armies in the country and under foreign command - an arrangement it cannot change? Naqi Asks.

Long time political commentator, Tariq Ali also weighs in saying that this is not sovereignty:

Painting a far bleaker picture and looking at Iraq in an international context, Francis Boyle, professor of international law says that many of the more powerful countries in the U.N. Security Council are only interested in carving up Iraq for their own interests. The peoples of the world are now witnessing the rapid decline of the United Nations itself along the lines of what happened to the League of Nations in the 1930s. Can World War III be far behind? he asked.

U.S. Retains Real Control; U.N. Role Unclear

At the beginning of June, 2004, United Nations (UN) resolution 1546 was unanimously passed endorsing the June 30 transfer of sovereignty in Iraq and giving authorization for a U.S.-led multinational force. The unanimity came because there was enough ambiguity and compromise in the resolution. Amongst many other things, the resolution:

• Would allow the multinational force to serve at the request of the incoming interim government of Iraq and the force can be asked to leave at anytime.
• Allow the force to take all necessary measures to contribute to maintenance of security and stability in Iraq allowing a 12-month deadline for the force to be reviewed.
• Leave the interim government in power until national elections are held preferrably on December 31, 2004 though no later than January 31, 2005.

As CSM noted (in anticipation of the resolution), this would be good for both the U.S. in its international relations, and for Iraq, that will be given some world legitimacy even though it is a hand-picked interim government.

However, as Christian Science Monitor also added

• There was a lack of any real definition of a UN role;
• Along with continuing limits on the abilities of a new Iraqi government, the US will remain largely in charge of Iraq;
• The multinational force would comprise of 158,000 foreign troops, under U.S. command, 138,000 of which are American.

CSM also spoke to Lee Feinstein, a security expert at the Council on Foreign Relations and former official at the State Department, who indicated the preference of the U.S. to have some control and influence in Iraq: The Bush administration could have made getting more international participation - troops and money - a larger focus of its diplomacy, and it would have used the resolution to do that, says Mr. Feinstein, But that would have required real bargaining, whereas they preferred the large American embassy that's being set up working pretty much alone with the Iraqi government.

Due to the continued U.S. presence and command in this way, some criticize the U.N. resolution of, in effect, legitimizing the occupation.

Real Legitimacy

Perhaps Iraq's real legitimacy will come from the U.S. truly leaving Iraq, eventually. As so many have pointed out, not all the resistance is terrorist and Islamic militancy in nature. Some resistenence appears to be because of the want to get rid of foreign occupation from their land. No doubt, some non-Islamic militant/extremist groups also want to fill in power vaccums themselves, and may not be democratic either, but not all resistance can be characterized that way, either.

On Friday July 2, 2004, Channel 4 news (I think -- it could have been the BBC) in U.K. broadcast a piece on Iraq looking at the torture legacy of Saddam Hussein. They intervied someone who claimed to have been tortured by Saddam for many years in prison. Yet, almost surprisingly, when questioned about his views on the current occupation forces, he said that while he was happy the U.S. got rid of Saddam, at his earliest opportunity he would like to join forces with others who are violently trying to eject the U.S. from their land. One of the things that had convinced him of this cause was the torture U.S. troops were committing on Iraqi captives. Ironically, having suffered torture for many years under Saddam Hussein, this person was now equating the U.S. occupation forces with Saddam.

Professor of History, William Marina offers an interesting parallel in history:

Media handling of handover

Many mainstream media outlets have presented a sort of idealistic view of what the handover represents, though a few have noted various ironies, some, such as Channel 4 in the UK even suggesting that the transfer of sovereignty may still be viewed as occupation. David Edwards, co-editor of media watchdog MediaLens, surveys a lot of mainstream media responses and notes:

U.S.-led Coalition Cannot Account for Billions of Iraq's Dollars

At the end of June 2004, just when the new interim government was to be announced, the British charity and development organization, Christian Aid noted that:

However, as Christian Aid also notes, they themselves highlighted in October 2003 that some $4 billion were unaccounted for then. That this is Iraq's money and being handled by the U.S., and still not being accounted for, is perhaps as scandalous as Sadam Hussein's lavish spending on weapons and palaces.

Iraq starts off with a lot of its own money missing as a result, which is a big problem in a country with a lot of instability and violence, unemployment and urgently needing to show credibility and effort to get things moving.

IPS also reporting on Christian Aid's report also adds that lack of transparency is leading to unaccountability: